Real rules and transparency for payThere again given the way that they pay themselves and the way in which they fight to maintain their privilages they probably wouldn't want the same binding principles applying to them.
The resolution on remuneration policies in the financial sector and remuneration of directors of listed companies argues that tougher measures are needed to reduce
incentives to take risks significantly and avoid the need for taxpayers to pick up the costs.
To achieve this, the resolution asks the Commission to adopt strong binding principles on remuneration policies in the financial sector, which would go further than what can be provided for through the capital requirements directives. Listed companies whose directors' remuneration policy does not comply with these principles would be required to explain their reasons.
The resolution goes into the corporate governance systems needed to develop sound remuneration policies, including stronger shareholder control of salaries of directors in listed companies. It also advocates an effective alignment of compensation with prudent risk-taking, remuneration oversight powers for supervisors, and bonus
limits, to ensure a balance between the fixed and variable parts of a pay packet.
Now I have no problem with shareholders keeping a close eye on pay rates, but it is their choice to do dso, or not do so, notthe EU's job at all.